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Abstract
This paper focuses on the evolution of child labour, fertility and human
capital in an economy with two production sectors and two types of workers
endowed with two different levels of human capital. Adults allocate their time
endowment between work and child rearing and choose the time allocation of
children between schooling and work. The heterogeneity between low and high
skilled workers allows for an endogenous analysis of inequality generated by
child labour. We show that the persistence of child labour can be explained
through the competition between children and low-skilled workers. This persis-
tence, in turn, can easily induce an increase in the inequality and an average
impoverishment within the country.
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1 Introduction
According to the ILO (International Labour Organization) more than 200 mil-
lion children in the world today are involved in child labour. Child labour
persists even if it has been declared illegal at both the national and interna-
tional levels. As is apparent from Figure 1 the number of children who aren’t
enrolled in primary or secondary school decreases with per capita income. We
use the data on children not attending school as a proxy of child labour since
the shortage of data on child labour.
Figure 1: Children out of school, primary. Nonparametric kernel smoother, year 2007. Data
are from World Development Indicators (2010).
A large body of the literature has developed theoretical and empirical models
to study the causes of child labour persistence. The benchmark framework is
based on two main axioms: the luxury axiom and the substitution axiom (Basu
and Van, 1998). The luxury axiom implies that parents send children to work if
their income is below a certain threshold. The substitution axiom implies that
adult labour and child labour are substitutes. These axioms lead to multiple
equilibria in the labour market, with one equilibrium where adult wage is low
and children work and another where adult wage is high and children do not
work.
This framework has been recently extended by Hazan and Berdugo (2002)
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and Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) which introduce endogenous fertility choices.
They analyze the relationship between child labour, fertility and human capital
showing the existence of multiple development path. In early stages of devel-
opment, the economy is in a development trap where child labour is abundant,
fertility is high and output per capita is low. Technological progress, allows
a take-off from the underdevelopment trap because it gradually increases the
wage differential between parental and child labour and hence the return of
investment in education.
However these contributions do not consider the presence of inequality,
i.e. the economy can follow different paths of growth that are characterized
– in equilibrium – by a unique level human capital. We extend this framework
taking into account two groups of individuals with two different levels of hu-
man capital. In this respect our work is related to the literature on inequality,
differential fertility, and economic growth. In particular, Moav (2005) develops
a theory of fertility that offers an explanation for the persistence of poverty
within and across countries. The basic idea is that the cost of child quantity
increases with parent’s human capital since the opportunity cost of time is high.
High-income families choose low fertility rates and high investment in education.
This implies that high income persist in the dynasty. On the other hand, poor
households choose relatively high fertility rates with relatively low investment
in their offspring’s education. Therefore, their offspring are poor as well. De la
Croix and Doepke (2003) argue that a higher inequality, by increasing fertility
differential between rich and poor families, lowers average education and, there-
fore, growth. The motivation for this result is that a large fertility differential
implies more weight on children with little education.
Our paper focus on the evolution of child labour, fertility and human capital
in an economy with two production sectors - traditional and modern - and two
types of workers - low and high skilled. In particular, traditional sector employs
unskilled labour while the modern sector uses unskilled and skilled workers.
According to the existent literature, we assume that child labour is a perfect
substitute for unskilled adult but children are relatively less productive.
Adults allocate their time endowment between work and child raring. They
choose the time allocation of children between schooling and work. Hence,
households can have two, possible, sources of income: income by parents and
child income. Parents preferences are defined over the consumption of the two
goods, the number of children, and the children’s future level of human capital.
Human capital of children is an increasing, strictly concave function of the time
devoted to school. If child’s time is devoted entirely to work they enter the
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adult age with a minimum level of human capital (see Galor and Weil, 2000; De
la Croix and Doepke, 2004; Hazan and Berdugo, 2002).
We show that when the relative wage between adult labour and child labour
is below a certain threshold parents have a high number of children and send
them to work, while when income is above this threshold fertility decreases
and parents find optimal educate their children. This framework allows for an
endogenous analysis of inequality generated by child labour. The model shows
a strong persistence of child labour which is mainly due to the fertility choices
of the two groups. In this respect we find a result similar to the De la Croix and
Doepke (2003), but differently from them we show that the presence of the child
labour increases the persistence of inequality. Indeed, low-skilled workers do not
find convenient to change the children time allocation between schooling and
work if unskilled wage increases. We show that inequality persists and increases
in the long run.
Section 2 introduces the basic structure of the model. Section 3 describes the
optimal individual choices. In Section 4, we investigate the general equilibrium
configurations of the model. In Section 5, analysis the long run dynamics of the
model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze an overlapping-generation economy that consists of two sectors: an
agricultural and a modern sector. In every period t, the economy is populated
by Nt individuals. Each of them is endowed with a level of human capital, hit.
This level is endogenously determined by parent’s choice on the children’s time
allocation between labour and schooling. Adults can supply skilled or unskilled
labour, while children can only supply unskilled labour.
2.1 Production
Production in the agricultural sector occurs within a period according to a linear
production technology using unskilled labour as inputs. The output produced
at time t, YA,t, is:
YA,t = ηLA,t, (1)
where LA,t is the amount of unskilled labour employed in the production of the
agricultural good in period t, and η > 0 is a technological parameter representing
the average and marginal productivity of labour.
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Production in the modern sector occurs within a period according to a neo-
classical, constant return to scale, Cobb–Douglas production technology using
unskilled and skilled labour as inputs. The output produced at time t, YM,t, is:
YM,t = ψ(Ht)µ(LM,t)1−µ = ψ(hM,t)µLM,t; 0 < µ < 1, (2)
where hM,t ≡ Ht/LM,t is the ratio of skilled Ht to unskilled labor LM,t employed
in the production of the modern good in period t, ψ > 0 is the technological
level in the modern sector.
Assuming the modern good as numeraire, i.e. pM,t = 1, the wage of unskilled
workers in the agricultural sectors is:
wut = pA,tη, (3)
where pA,t is the price of agricultural good.
In the modern sector, the wage of unskilled workers, i.e. wut , and the wage
rate per efficiency unit wst are:
wut = ψ(1− µ) (hM,t)µ , (4)
and
wst = ψµ (hM,t)
µ−1
. (5)
Free mobility of unskilled workers between the modern and agricultural sectors
leads to the equalization of wages of unskilled labour in both sectors. Hence,
from equations (3) and (4) we get:
pA,t =
ψ(1− µ) (hM,t)µ
η
.
2.2 Preferences
Members of generation t live for two periods: childhood and adulthood. In the
first period of their lives, individuals may either work, go to school or both.
In the second period of their lives, agents supply unskilled or skilled labour.
Individual’s preferences are defined over the consumption of agricultural good,
i.e. ciA,t, the consumption of modern good, i.e. c
i
M,t, the number of children n
i
t,
and the human capital of children hit+1.
1 The utility function of an agent i of
generation t is given by:
1As it is clear from equation (6), we assume that parents are aware of the human capital
of their children rather than their income. Although the results of the model are not crucially
affected by this choice, we believe that this is a more realistic assumption, see for instance De
la Croix and Doepke (2003) for discussion on this point.
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U it = α ln[
(
ciA,t)
γ(ciM,t
)1−γ
] + (1− α) ln(nithit+1), (6)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the altruism factor and γ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter of preference
between consumption goods.
We suppose that children born with some basic human capital a which can
be increased by attending school. In particular, human capital of children in
period t + 1 is an increasing, strictly concave function of the time devoted to
school (see Galor and Weil, 2000; De la Croix and Doepke, 2004; Hazan and
Berdugo, 2002):
hit+1 = a(b+ e
i
t)
β , (7)
where a, b > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1).
Parents allocate their income between the consumption of the two goods,
i.e ciA,t and c
i
M,t and child rearing. In particular, raising each born child takes
a fraction z ∈ (0, 1) of an adult’s income. In addition, parents allocates the
time endowment of children between schooling, eit ∈ [0, 1], and labour force
participation (1−eit) ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that, each child can offer only θ ∈ [0, 1]
units of unskilled labour, that is children are substitutes for unskilled adult
workers but relatively less productive. Therefore, each household can have two,
possible, sources of income: i) income by parents Iit = maxw
s
th
i
t, w
u
t and, ii)
child income (1 − eit)θwut . While children can work only as unskilled workers,
and their income would be θwut , parents will choose to work in the sector that
guarantees them a higher income. Hence, the budget constraint is
pA,tc
i
A,t + c
i
M,t ≤ (1− znit)Iit + (1− eit)θwut nit. (8)
Assumption 2.1. We assume that the opportunity cost of raising a child must
be higher than the wage she/he gets in the labour market:
z > θ (9)
Assumption (2.1) implies that the relative return of child labour when each
child just works is θ/z < 1.
As investigation strategy, we first analyze the optimal individual’s choices
when the wage ratio, wst /w
u
t , is fixed. This analysis allows us to show the
presence of multiple equilibria, coherently with the literature on endogenous
fertility and accumulation of human capital. The second step is to consider two
types of individuals characterized by two different level of human capital, high
and low. Under this assumption we determine the wage ratio which guarantees,
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in each period, the market clearing. Finally we investigate the long run dynamics
of this equilibria taking together the individual accumulation of human capital
and the equilibrium conditions.
3 Individual choices
Each household has to choose ciA,t, c
i
M,t, n
i
t and e
i
t so as to maximize the utility
function (6) subject to the budget constraint (8). Given the relative wage,
under assumption 2.1, the optimal consumption of the two goods, the optimal
schooling and the optimal number of children chosen by member i of generation
t are given by:
ciA,t =
γαIit
pA,t
, (10)
ciM,t = (1− γ)αIit , (11)
eit =

0 if rit ≤ θ(β+b)βz ,
ritβz−θ(β+b)
θ(1−β) if
θ(β+b)
βz ≤ rit ≤ θ(1+b)βz ,
1 if rit ≥ θ(1+b)βz .
(12)
and:
nit =

(1−α)rit
zrit−θ if r
i
t ≤ θ(β+b)βz ,
(1−α)(1−β)rit
zrit−θ(1+b) if
θ(β+b)
βz ≤ rit ≤ θ(1+b)βz ,
1−α
z if r
i
t ≥ θ(1+b)βz .
(13)
where rit ≡ Iit/wut .
Given wst /w
u
t , agents, according to their level of human capital h
i
t, will choose
to work as unskilled if, and only if, wsth
i
t < w
u
t , otherwise they work as skilled.
Since hit = a(b + e
i
t−1)
β , the ratio rit is a function of the level of education at
the period t− 1, that is:
rit =

1 if eit−1 ≤ eˆt−1,
wsth
i
t
wut
if eit−1 ≥ eˆt−1,
where eˆt−1 = (wut /w
s
t )
1/β − b.
In other words, if parents find convenient to work as unskilled, their choices
on fertility and education do not depend on income, since rit = 1 – see equa-
tions (12) and (13). This result is a consequence of the perfect substitutability
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: The dynamics of education when θz ≥ ββ+b .
between child and unskilled adult labour. Hence, if parent’s education is below
the threshold level eˆt−1, their choices are given by the relation between some pa-
rameters values of the model. In particular, we have that all the adults working
as unskilled do not invest in education (et = 0) if
θ
z
≥ β
β + b
, (14)
that is, if the ratio between the income of child labour and the cost of rising
children, i.e. the relative return of child labour, is sufficiently high, then unskilled
parents, i.e. eit−1 ≤ eˆt−1, choose to send children to work and do not invest in
education. When eit−1 ≥ eˆt−1 skilled parents send children to schooling only
when eit−1 is sufficiently high, that is e
i
t−1 ≥ et−1 (see figure 3). Therefore:
eit =

0 if eit−1 ≤ et−1,
wst
wut
βz
θ(1−β)a(b+ e
i
t−1)
β − θ(β+b)θ(1−β) if et−1 ≤ eit−1 ≤ e¯t−1,
1 if e¯t−1 ≤ eit−1 ≤ 1.
(15)
where:
et−1 =
[
θ(β + b)
aβz
wut
wst
]1/β
− b,
and:
e¯t−1 =
[
θ(1 + b)
aβz
wut
wst
]1/β
− b.
Simple calculations show that e¯t−1 > et−1 > eˆt−1.
If relative return of child rearing when each child just works is below a certain
level but above the elasticity of human capital with respect to education, when
education is to its maximum level e = 1, that is:
β
1 + b
≤ θ
z
≤ β
β + b
, (16)
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: The dynamics of education when β1+b ≤ θz ≤ ββ+b .
the optimal education choice is always positive regardless the level of eit−1 (see
figure 3). In particular:
eit =

βz−θ(β+b)
θ(1−β) if e
i
t−1 ≤ eˆt−1,
wst
wut
βz
θ(1−β)a(b+ e
i
t−1)
β − θ(β+b)θ(1−β) if eˆt−1 ≤ eit−1 ≤ e¯t−1,
1 if e¯t−1 ≤ eit−1 ≤ 1.
Finally when the relative return of child rearing when each child just works is
below the elasticity of human capital with respect to education, that is :
θ
z
≤ β
1 + b
, (17)
the optimal education choice is always to its maximum level, that is eit = 1,
regardless the level of eit−1.
This analysis highlights the emergence of three different cases. In the first,
when inequality (14) holds, adults that work as unskilled do not invest in chil-
dren’s education. In this situation it is also possible that high-skilled workers
find convenient to choose eit = 0. In the second case, when inequality (16) holds,
all the population allocates a positive fraction of children’s time in education.
Finally in the third case, all the adults prefers to send their children to school
independently by the parent’s human capital, in this case the new generation is
characterized by the same and maximum level of education. We do not analyze
the third case since the result is obviously trivial. More interesting, as it can be
intuitively understood from Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, two groups of adults emerge. The
first characterized by the same low level of education, the second by a higher
one. For this reason in the following section we assume that at the beginning
there are only two groups of people characterized by low and high skilled.
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4 General Equilibrium
The results of previous section highlight that the ratio wu/ws is the crucial factor
which determines individual choices. Since choices on fertility and on children
time allocation between labour and schooling affect individual and aggregate
labour supply, in every period t, these choices also affect the ratio wu/ws. For
the sake of the argument we assume that in the initial period, t = 0, population
is divided in two groups which are endowed with two different levels of human
capital.
Since the endowment of human capital determines the income of each house-
hold, the economy is characterized by two classes of income. Thus, the two
groups make different fertility and schooling decisions. In the long run, differ-
ent fertility choices change the relative size of the two groups, and, as we will
analyze below, this process deeply affect our result.
In each period, the aggregate demand of the two goods are2
DA = cuAN
u + csAN
s, (18)
and
DM = cuMN
u + csMN
s. (19)
The income of the two groups depends on the level of hs and hu. Since
the demand in the modern sector is positive, there must be some adults that
work as skilled. This implies that at least the high-skilled workers must find
convenient to work as skilled, that is Is = wshs ≥ wu = Iu. In what follows we
assume that in the first period this inequality is strict, that is, the two groups
have different income. This assumption allow us to have initial inequality. In
order to derive the equilibrium outcomes and in particular the labour supply,
we must analyze two different cases: i) wsth
u
t < w
u
t , and ii) w
s
th
u
t = w
u
t .
Case 1: wshu < wu
In this case, all the low-skilled adults would choose to work as unskilled.
Hence, the supply of unskilled labour, L is given by the labour supplied by
low-skilled adults plus the labour supply of children. At equilibrium this supply
must be equal to the total demand of unskilled labour. Thus,
LA + LM = (1− znu)Nu + θ[(1− eu)nuNu + (1− es)nsNs]. (20)
2Since all the variables refer to period t, time index is avoided for simplicity.
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At the same time, the supply of skilled labour, given by the fertility choices
of high-skilled population must be equal to the demand of skilled labour, that
is
H = (1− zns)hsNs. (21)
The equilibrium in the goods market implies that total demand of both
goods should be equal to the their total supply, that is
YA = DA = cuAN
u + csAN
s, (22)
and
YM = DM = cuMN
u + csMN
s (23)
From equations (2), (4), (5), (11) and (23), it holds
LM = (1− γ)α (1− µ)hMN
u + µhsNs
hM
. (24)
The ratio between equations (21) and (24) defines the equilibrium level of hM ,
that is,
h∗M =
hs
1− µ
[
1− zns
(1− γ)α − µ
]
Ns
Nu
. (25)
Note that h∗M depends only on n
s. The other variables Ns, Nu and hs are given
at period t. In order to understand the relation between h∗M and n
s we must
rewrite rs given equation (25), that is,
rst =
wsth
s
t
wut
=
µα(1− γ)
(1− zns)− µα(1− γ)
Nu
Ns
. (26)
Therefore we can have different values of h∗M and r
s
t according to the values of
fertility of skilled workers at time t. In order to derive the possible equilibria in
any configuration we must solve the system given by equations (13) and (26).
In order to simplify the notation we denote: A ≡ αµ(1−γ) and xt ≡ Nut /Nst .
We obtain the following equilibria for ns and rs:
nst =

θ(1−A)−zAxt+
√
∆1(xt)
2θz x0 ≤ xt ≤ x2
θ(1+b)(1−A)−zAxt+
√
∆2(xt)
2θz x2 ≤ xt ≤ x3
(1−α)
z xt ≥ x3
(27)
and:
rst =

2θAxt
θ(1−A)+zAxt−
√
∆1(xt)
x0 ≤ xt ≤ x2
2θ(1+b)Axt
θ(1+b)(1−A)+zAxt−
√
∆2(xt)
x2 ≤ xt ≤ x3
Axt
α−A xt ≥ x3
(28)
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where ∆1(xt) = [zAxt − θ(1−A)]2 + 4θ(1− α)zAxt and ∆2(xt) = [zAxt −
θ(1 + b)(1−A)]2 + 4θ(1− β)(1− α)zAxt.
In the Appendix we obtain the values for x0, x2 and x3 and we show how they
may change according to the values of parameters. Note that for any value of
xt there is only one value for the fertility of high skilled workers which is an
equilibrium.
Given the equilibrium values of fertility choices, we obtain all the other
variables of the model as a function of xt: in particular, children time allocation
between work and schooling, the accumulation of human capital for high-skilled
adults, the wage ratio.
Note that while in the first case presented in Section 3 – when inequality
(14) holds – xt can lie in one of the three intervals highlighted in equation (27),
in the second case – when inequality (16) holds – the first interval does not exist
since the high skilled workers always invest in education.
Case 2: wshu = wu
In this case, the ratio rst = h
s/hu. Hence from equation (12) we can directly
characterize the dynamic of human capital as follows:
hst+1 =

abβ if hst ≤ θ(β+b)βz hut ,
a
[
hs
hu βz−θ(1+b)
θ(1−β)
]β
if θ(β+b)βz h
u ≤ hs ≤ θ(1+b)βz hu,
a(1 + b)β if hs ≥ θ(1+b)βz hu.
(29)
The fact that rt does not depend on other variables strictly depend on the
maximization of profits in production.
In order to investigate the relation between the two cases presented above
and the possible long run equilibria, next section focuses on the dynamics of the
model.
5 Long Run
Fertility choices of the two groups affect the relative size of high and low skilled
labour. This relation is crucial in determining the wage ratio, and hence the
dynamics of human capital.
Since Nut+1 = n
u
tN
u
t and N
s
t+1 = n
s
tN
s
t , the population dynamics is given by
Nt+1 = nutN
u
t + n
s
tN
s
t . (30)
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At the same time it is possible to determine the dynamics of xt ≡ Nut /Nst .
Indeed we have that
xt+1 =
nut
nst
xt (31)
The long run equilibria imply that the choices of individuals do not change
from one period to the next. Since the fertility choices between the two groups
are different, the ratio xt changes over time. In particular starting from wshu <
wu, we have that the number of children of low-skilled workers is higher than the
one of high-skilled workers. Hence xt tends to increase over time. This process
leads to a continuous increase in the ratio ws/wu. Hence, the population dy-
namics generates an increase in the return of human capital, which is completely
caught by the high-skilled workers. Indeed, the low-skilled workers are trapped
in a low-skilled equilibrium. This process generates a continuous increase in the
inequality and an increase in child labour, since generation by generation the
number of low-skilled workers increases with respect to the high-skilled.
The continuous increase in the wage ratio induces to satisfy, at a certain
time, t˜, the equality ws
t˜
hu = wu
t˜
.
Before t˜, from equations (27) and (31), we obtain that the dynamics of
population ratio is
xt+1 =

2zθnuxt
θ(1−A)−zAxt+
√
∆1(xt)
x0 ≤ xt ≤ x2
2zθ(1+b)nuxt
θ(1+b)(1−A)−zAxt+
√
∆2(xt)
x2 ≤ xt ≤ x3
znuxt
(1−α) xt ≥ x3
(32)
where nu is given by
nut =

(1−α)
z−θ if 1 ≤ θ(β+b)βz ,
(1−α)(1−β)
z−θ(1+b) if
θ(β+b)
βz ≤ 1 ≤ θ(1+b)βz ,
1−α
z if 1 ≥ θ(1+b)βz .
(33)
that replicates the three cases underlined in Section 3.
From equation (32) we are able to characterize all the possible long term
equilibria of the model.
Case a. When low skilled workers do not invest in education, i. e. 1 ≤ θ(β+b)βz ,
we could have the following results.
i. if xt ≤ x2, high skilled workers send their children to work, then in the
following period the inequality in the economy disappears and all the
population will be characterized with the minimum level of human capital;
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ii. if x2 ≤ xt ≤ x3, high skilled workers allocate the children time between
schooling and labour. Generation by generation the income of skilled
adults increases. If this process reach est = 1 for t < t˜, then the high skilled
workers reach the maximum level of capital, but their size in the economy
reduces continuously. Although the choice of education and fertility are
fixed, until period t˜ the income of high skilled increases. After period t˜ all
the variable of the model are at equilibrium. If instead the economy reach
t˜ before et = 1 the accumulation of human capital of high skilled workers
would change according to equation (29).
iii. if xt ≥ x3 the high skilled workers would choose the maximum level of
education and their income increases until period t˜.
Case b. When low skilled workers allocate children time between schooling
and labour, i.e. θ(β+b)βz ≤ 1 ≤ θ(1+b)βz , the low-skilled workers have an higher
human capital with respect to the previous case. This implies that the condition
wsth
u
t = w
u
t can be easily reached. In particular we have that
i. the high skilled workers cannot send their children to work since they get
a wage higher than the low skilled workers.
ii. if x2 ≤ xt ≤ x3, high skilled workers allocate the children time between
schooling and labour, but the fraction of time spent to education is greater
than that of the low skilled workers. It is more likely that the increase in
the wage ratio reach t = t˜ before est = 1. Hence this economy would be
characterized by a lower inequality even if most of the low-skilled workers
continuous to work as unskilled.
iii. if xt ≥ x3 the high skilled workers would choose the maximum level of
education and their income increases until period t˜.
The transition can go on for several generation. During that transition the
inequality in the economy increases and there will be an increase in child labour,
since the unskilled population would increase more than the skilled one. The
fact that fertility is endogenous to the model determine such a result. The
two groups have different choices of fertility and the high-skilled group become
smaller with respect to the total population, implying that they will get a higher
wage.
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6 Final Remarks
This paper is built on the idea that the persistence of child labour is strictly
linked to the presence of inequality within the country. For this reason we
present a model where the population is divided in two groups endowed with
two different level of human capital. We study how this initial heterogeneity
affect the distribution of income in the long run. The crucial result of this
analysis is that the increase in the return of human capital is not sufficient to
induce a transition to a high-skilled economy. The presence of two groups, with
different levels of initial human capital, generates a continuous increase in the
income of the high skilled workers with respect to those endowed with a low
level of human capital. This, in turn, implies that inequality in the economy
will increase. The presence of endogenous fertility induces low income group
to make an higher number of children. Thus, child labour will increase. The
substitutability between adult and child labour increases the resilience of this
result: the economy is trapped in an equilibrium with a high fraction of the
population with low income and low human capital.
This framework can be easily extended to evaluate the issues currently dis-
cussed in the literature. For instance, further research is needed to analyze the
role of technical progress and international labour standards. With respect to
the first issue, preliminary results seem to reject the hypothesis that technical
progress can by itself induce the low-skilled group to invest in children’s educa-
tion. Another interesting application of the model is to evaluate public policies
that through taxation on high-skilled individual may subsidies the low-skilled
labour inducing them to invest in education. This policy may generate together
a reduction of inequality and the disappearance of child labour.
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In order to obtain the threshold level x0, x2 and x3, we can proceed as follows. First, let us
consider the case D ≡ θ(β+b)
βz
≥ 1. This implies that low skilled workers choose the highest
fertility and zero investment in education. In order to get an equilibrium in which the high
skilled workers invest zero in education, that is in terms of fertility
nst =
(1− α)rst
zrst−θ
, (34)
the income ratio between skilled and unskilled should be less than D, i.e. rst ∈ [1, D]. If this
condition is satisfy from equations (26) and (34) we get
ns1
∗ =
θ(1−A)− zAxt +
√
∆1
2θz
, (35)
and
rs1
∗ =
2θAxt
θ(1−A) + zAxt −
√
∆1
, (36)
where ∆1 = [zAxt − θ(1−A)]2 + 4θ(1− α)zAxt. From equation (44), we obtain that rst ≥ 1
if and only if:
xt ≥ x0 ≡
8><>:
θ(1−A)
A(2θ−z) if z ≤ 2θ,
z(α−A)−θ(1−A)
A(z−θ) otherwise
(37)
and, rst ≤ D if and only if
xt ≤ x2 = θ(b+ β)[b(α−A)− β(1− α)]
zAβb
. (38)
The two thresholds, x0 and x2, determine the interval of the first line of equation (27).
In order to get an equilibrium for
nst =
(1− α)(1− β)rst
zrst−θ(1+b)
, (39)
that is where high skilled workers allocate the children time between schooling and work,
the income ratio between skilled and unskilled should satisfy rst ∈ [max 1, D,E], where E =
θ(1+b)
βz
. While the equilibrium ns1
∗ can be realized if and only if D ≥ 1, ns2∗ does not have
this restriction. If rst ∈ [max 1, D,E] is satisfy from equations (26) and (34) we get
ns2
∗ =
θ(1 + b)(1−A)− zAxt +
√
∆2
2θz
, (40)
and
rs2
∗ =
2θ(1 + b)Axt
θ(1 + b)(1−A) + zAxt −
√
∆2
, (41)
where ∆2(xt) = [zAxt − θ(1 + b)(1 − A)]2 + 4θ(1 − β)(1 − α)zAxt. From equation (??), we
obtain that rst ≥ max 1, D if and only if xt ≥ x2. It is not surprising that rs1∗ = rs2∗ when
xt = x2; hence, the function is continuous. Furthermore, rst ≤ E if and only if xt ≤ x3, where
x3 =
θ(α−A)(1 + b)
Aβz
. (42)
By applying the same procedure, we get that the high skilled workers do not send their children
to work if and only if
ns3
∗ =
(1− α)
z
, (43)
and
rs3
∗ =
Axt
α−A, (44)
if and only if rst ≥ E, that is if xt ≥ x3.
Hence we obtain equations (27) and (28).
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